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Introduction
The concept of distributing economic results 
belongs unequivocally among the basic fi nancial 
decisions of management. Dividend payout to 
shareholders can be considered to be dividing 
profi ts while fulfi lling legal conditions. For many 
shareholders, the payment of dividends is an 
important part of their investment decisions. 
Dividend policy can be defi ned as determining 
the method which provides the basis for 
whether profi ts will be withheld, shared or used 
for other purposes. Financial management 
must implement dividend policy in accordance 
with other fi nancial decisions, i.e., primarily with 
investment (how and in to which activities to 
invest resources) and fi nancial (what sources to 
use to fi nance their activities) decisions. From the 
perspective of fi nancial theory, dividend policy is 
usually considered against the backdrop of the 
company’s original goal, which is – according 
to current fi nancial economics – maximizing 
the fi rm’s market value. In 1961, economists 
[27] published a theoretical article with the title: 
“Dividend Policy, Growth and the Valuation of 
Shares,” which is still one of the most discussed 
controversies in fi nancial theory. The authors of 
this article submitted scientifi c evidence about 
the fact that a shareholder or potential investor 
is irrelevant to the company’s dividend policy, 
because this does not infl uence fi rm value. In 
other words, receiving dividends or withholding 
and reinvesting company profi t is considered 
mutually interchangeable. According to this 
theory, if the profi t is reinvested, the fi rm’s market 
value increases to the level that the investor 
would receive in the case of sale of shares plus 
the equivalent amount of unpaid dividends. Their 
article was a genuine breakthrough, because, 
at that point, most economists believed that the 
appropriate dividend policy would infl uence the 
fi rm’s market value. According to the authors, 
the one determinant which does infl uence the 
fi rm’s market value is the fi rm’s investment 
options, therefore, not the dividend amount. 
The company should accept only projects with 
positive net present value when accepting 
such projects leads to maximizing the fi rm’s 
market value. This theory is founded on the 
presumption of the existence of a perfect 
capital market; according to critics of the 
theory, this does not exist, because the world 
is full of market imperfections. Another premise 
is the existence of absolute certainty when 
decision-making concerning economic entities 
and the rational behavior of all participants of 
the fi nancial market in the case that everyone 
has access to the same informational content 
and zero transaction costs. Despite these 
relatively strong and unrealistic preliminary 
requirements, it emerges from the authors’ work 
that the dividend does not raise fi rm value by 
itself, but only implicitly through the market’s 
imperfections.
A signifi cant reason why companies pay 
dividends is the existence of the principal-agent 
theory. To a certain degree, dividend payout 
can reduce confl icts that can arise on account 
of the differing interests of individual parties 
during the administration and management of 
the company.
Asymmetrical information is one cause of the 
market mechanism’s failure. The actual market 
does not evaluate known and certain values, but 
evaluates the prospective trend of a company’s 
current and future yields. When it is assumed 
that managers have more timely information 
about the company’s actual value and potential, 
dividend payments carry information about the 
company’s future profi tability.
Another signifi cant characteristic that 
infl uences individual companies’ dividend policy 
is taxes. More or less, different countries have 
different tax systems, which categorize capital 
and dividend yields into frequently differing tax 
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groups; for example, there may be high rates 
of implemented tax dependent on the investor’s 
income.
The fi rm life-cycle theory of dividends 
explains how companies adapt payout ratio 
dependent on their own development when, on 
one hand, the costs drop for acquiring borrowed 
capital, and, on the other hand, agency costs 
are incurred. According to [25], the condition of 
uncertainty makes dividend decision-making 
a behavioral question, when an increase in 
profi t is transferred to the dividend only when 
a fi rm is certain that it will not have to revise its 
decision in the future.
The large number of articles appearing 
(primarily in international literature) is evidence 
that the problem of dividend policy has not yet 
been satisfactorily resolved. For the most part, 
current empirical studies are founded on data 
that have come out of maturely developed 
countries. Recently, gaps have been fi lled in the 
form of studies founded on data from developing 
countries. Studies show the existence of 
signifi cant differences in dividend policy 
implemented in companies – not only on the 
market overall, but also within individual sectors. 
There are only a few papers devoted to dividend 
policy in professional Czech literature [13], [33], 
which come from the fi rst half of the last decade.
From theoretical and empirical studies, it 
is apparent that the signifi cance of dividend 
policy as a tool for maximizing the shareholders’ 
wealth is not clear-cut for individual companies. 
If we take into consideration that each company 
determines its dividend policy as a function of 
the market imperfection it faces, this conclusion 
is not surprising.
The goal of this article is to identify factors 
that have a fundamental infl uence on dividend 
payout and to further determine and evaluate 
the position of management on dividend 
theories. This goal is current as set within the 
conditions of Czech joint-stock companies, 
because deeper studies in this area are not 
available for recent years. Nevertheless, the 
greater majority of joint-stock companies 
currently pay dividends and dividend policy has 
become a part of their fi nancial policy that is 
impossible to overlook.
1. The Reasons Why Companies Pay 
Dividends
Various theories have been developed to explain 
the reasons why companies pay dividends. 
According to critics of the thesis about dividend 
irrelevancy, these authors’ [27] model is too 
abstract and unusable in the real fi nancial world. 
Looking from the perspective of their potential 
impact on dividend irrelevance, the authors 
distinguish three large market imperfections: 
(1) principal-agency, (2) information asymmetry 
and (3) taxes [24]. In addition, empirical studies 
claim that company characteristics such as 
the phase in a company’s life cycle, ownership 
structure, the number of shareholders and fi rm 
size all play a fundamental role in dividend 
payout. Not least when considering dividend 
determination, is the behavioral question.
1.1 Market Imperfections
The division of management from company 
ownership leads to agency confl ict; this can 
result in situations where the shareholders’ and 
management’s interests do not coincide, and 
they can even end up working against each 
other. Management’s members centralize the 
daily managerial agency in their hands, but they 
are not the investors. This managerial agency 
requires decision-making, which is regularly 
supported by the use of quantitative methods 
[9]. Naturally, this leads to confl ict that, on one 
hand, admits the possibility of the investment’s 
direct devaluation and concern about the 
ineffective use of entrusted fi nancial resources 
as well as the possibility of opportunistic 
behavior on the part of management or 
minimizing risk when conducting business 
[18]. To a certain degree, dividend payout can 
actually reduce this type of managerial confl ict. 
Dividend payout changes the ratio of owned 
capital and borrowed capital as well as the 
decrease of fi nancial resources. As a result, the 
company must take care of necessary fi nancial 
resources for investment on the fi nancial market. 
The fi nancial market represents not only an 
important source for fi nancing enterprises, but 
also the main supervisory institution overseeing 
the management’s behavior ([10], [17]).
In companies, agency confl ict also 
occurs between the majority and minority 
shareholders. The authors of [34] state that 
problems of agency related to signifi cant joint-
stock interest are more diffi cult to supervise 
than problems of agency which occur in relation 
to delegating management’s decision-making 
powers. The authors of [22] present two models 
for a company’s minority shareholder dividend 
policy, which are modifi ed and empirically 
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tested in various forms. In the fi rst, minority 
shareholders use their power and request 
dividend payout because of limited potential 
for personal reward on the part of the majority 
shareholders. Empirical studies by these 
authors [16] support this hypothesis. The second 
model presumes the dividend is a substitute 
mechanism for relieving confl ict between 
minority and majority shareholders. Majority 
shareholders are motivated to pay dividends 
primarily in countries with low safeguards for 
minority shareholders with the goal of creating 
a good company reputation and, therefore, 
ensuring better access to sources for fi nancing 
the company. Empirical studies by these authors 
[19] support this hypothesis.
Finally, the third agency problem concerns 
the confl ict between the fi rm alone and 
third parties, primarily concerning company 
creditors. The authors of [31] present a number 
of ways for shareholders to expropriate wealth 
from creditors. One of the most common ways 
is insuffi cient investments where shareholders 
prioritize dividend distribution at the expense 
of investments in new projects, which leads 
to increasing risk from the perspective of the 
creditors. The authors of [5] followed up on this 
idea in article [22] and consider the dividend 
to be a substitute mechanism for relieving 
confl ict between shareholders and creditors. In 
their empirical research involving 35 countries 
around the world, the authors of [7] come to 
the conclusion that creditors have a greater 
infl uence on dividend politics than shareholders.
The work with information is among the 
factors that decide about the quality of business 
activities-therefore it is the resource of inimitable 
competitive advantages [29]. Another market 
imperfection is the existence of information 
asymmetry between shareholders and 
management. According to the conclusion of 
the authors of [27] the dividend alone does not 
increase fi rm value. Information about expected 
future profi ts, which the dividend yields, 
increases fi rm value. If the signaling theory is 
correct, investors can then deduce information 
about the company’s future profi tability by 
changes in dividend policy.
Part of the signaling theory is the 
assumption of information asymmetry 
between managers and investors in access 
to information about company prospects. It 
is possible to overcome this asymmetry with 
the help of dividend signaling. In order for this 
signal to be credible, it must carry costs with 
it, which limits less successful companies from 
false signaling using dividends. These costs are 
generally understood to be higher tax rates [20], 
though they can be also transaction costs [4] 
or costs coming from sub-investment [28]. All 
three models agree on the conclusion that more 
profi table companies pay higher dividends 
as well as that higher dividends are linked to 
higher stock prices.
The extensive empirical research that has 
been previously conducted does not give clear-
cut support for the signaling theory. Evidence 
that a relationship between dividends and stock 
price exists was confi rmed by the majority of 
empirical research that has been conducted 
(e.g. [1], [26]). Nonetheless, empirical evidence 
about whether dividends carry information 
concerning the fi rm’s future profi tability are not 
so clear-cut. Empirical studies confi rming that 
dividends carry information concerning future 
profi tability are [14] and [32], for example. 
Conversely, the relationship between dividends 
and future profi t was not confi rmed, for example, 
in this study [2].
For many investors, investment into shares 
is an important part of their decision-making 
processes. For situations with at least two 
alternative solutions, it is possible to successfully 
apply the methods of multiple-criteria decision 
analysis [15]. Various tax burdens for dividends 
and capital yields create different groups 
of investors interested in various corporate 
dividend policies. If capital yields are taxed with 
a lower rate than dividend yields, then investors 
with higher profi ts will prefer capital yields. On 
the other hand, the market has investors with 
lower or no tax from direct dividends, which are, 
in relation to the clientele effect, unequivocally 
for stocks with high dividends. If there is 
a change in their preferred company’s dividend 
policy, then investors can sell that company’s 
shares, or the company can attract a group 
of different investors, which can result in this 
infl uencing the price of shares.
Empirical verifi cation of this theory is 
conducted with the help of a drop in the stock 
price on the ex-dividend date. The authors of [11] 
were the fi rst to empirically confi rm the clientele 
effect theory. In conclusion, the authors found that 
investors from the group with higher tax burdens 
should prefer companies with lower dividend 
yields and the reverse. In researching the tax 
effect for the drop of prices on the  ex-dividend 
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date, empirical studies primarily use changes in 
tax systems. For example, the authors of [21] 
corroborated the tax clientele effect, though the 
tax effect was not upheld in the study by these 
authors [35], for example.
1.2 Other Reasons for Dividend 
Payout
We can add managerial preference to the list of 
other reasons why a fi rm pays dividends. In their 
research, the author of [25] performed a range 
of interviews with company managers on their 
fi rm’s dividend policy. The author alleges that, 
when there is uncertainty, dividend decision-
making becomes a behavioral question. One 
of the most important conclusions was that 
companies have a set long-term payout ratio. 
Therefore, joint-stock company management 
will not implement change in the dividend policy 
if they are not able to ensure a stable dividend 
level for the given time interval in the future. 
Management considers frequent changes 
in dividend policy to be a negative signal 
for investors in the form of future economic 
uncertainty for the company. These conclusions 
are supported by many empirical studies. 
The authors of [3] (1997 page of 1032) state: 
“Lintner’s model of dividends remains the best 
description of the dividend setting process 
available.” The authors of [23] state that over 
the course of the last 80 years, the number of 
companies that apply this model of corporate 
dividend politics has been increasing.
Another key factor is the theory of the fi rm 
life cycle. The fi rm life cycle theory assumes 
that dividend payout is dependent on the 
company’s developmental phase, where 
fi nancial indicators such as profi tability, size, 
investment opportunities and capital structure 
change over time. After reaching a certain life 
cycle phase, the company is not capable of 
fi nding appropriate investment resources for its 
generated cash fl ow, and, therefore, distributing 
fi nancial resources to investors in the form of 
dividends appears to be the most convenient 
strategy. This dividend theory explains how 
companies adjust payout ratio in dependence 
with their development when, on one hand, 
costs for obtaining borrowed capital decrease 
and, on the other hand, agency costs appear 
[6]. The authors of [12] assert that large, 
established companies with high profi ts and 
slow growth are more willing to pay dividends. 
The authors of [8] cite the ratio of undivided 
profi t to owned capital as an indicator of life 
cycle phase.
2. Research Goal and Methods
The research concept arose from existent 
fi ndings for the problematic being investigated. 
The basic research goal was to establish 
factors that infl uence management concerning 
dividend policy in the investigated sectors 
and the stance of respondents as to whether 
dividend policy can infl uence fi rm value. The 
following research questions and hypotheses 
were established for this purpose:
Research question: What factors infl uence 
management when making decisions 
concerning dividend payout?
Hypothesis H1: Dividend payout infl uences 
market imperfections, which results in 
infl uencing fi rm value. 
The following sub-hypothesis were defi ned 
to verify their validity:
H1a: Dividend policy infl uences fi rm value.
H1b: Dividend policy infl uences investment and 
fi nancial decision-making.
H1c: Dividend policy decreases information 
asymmetry between management and 
shareholders.
H1d: Dividend policy decreases agency costs 
between management and shareholders.
H1e: Dividend policy refl ects the shareholders 
requirements.
Regarding the fact that the necessary 
condition for dividend payout is profi t, research 
was aimed at the sector “Production and 
Distribution of Electricity, Gas and Water,” 
which is most interesting among Czech joint-
stock companies from the perspective of 
profi tability and frequency of dividend payout. 
For the reasons of quantitative research, 
a two-part questionnaire was created. The fi rst 
part of the questionnaire provided the answer 
to the research question and contained 20 
factors that infl uence dividend policy in the 
chosen sector. The choice of factors arose 
from both theoretical fi ndings on dividend 
theories as well as empirical examination. 
Other than this, the respondent had the option 
to fi ll in factors not included in the list. This 
option remained without response. Individual 
factors were evaluated with the help of a four-
point scale of importance where 0 = none, 
1 = low, 2 = medium, 3 = high concerning the 
importance of the given factor.
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For testing the importance of individual 
factors, the t-test was used; a two-sided 
hypothesis was tested as to whether the middle 
value of the factor’s importance equals an 
average of 1.5.
The second part of the questionnaire 
verifi ed the group of fi ve sub-hypotheses 
which were corroborating the main hypothesis 
of whether dividend policy can infl uence fi rm 
value. The respondents’ individual positions 
were evaluated with the help of a 1 to 5 scale 
where the value of 5 represented strong 
agreement, 4 = agreement, 3 = without opinion, 
2 = disagreement, and 1 = strong disagreement.
The validity of the sub-hypotheses was 
determined according to the number of answers 
obtained. The Wilcoxon signed-rank test was 
used to verify the signifi cance of individual 
assertions; in this, a two-sided (or a one-sided) 
hypothesis was tested for whether the middle 
value of the median equals 3 (or is larger or 
smaller than 3).
The starting point for establishing the scope 
of the basic sample group suitable for research 
was the Amadeus database. In the Czech 
Republic, there are 225 companies active in this 
sector out of an overall number of 25,237 joint-
stock companies. Of these, the largest number 
of companies are producers and distributors of 
electricity, gas, steam and hot water (around 
2/3); the remainder are concerned with water 
manufacture and treatment. With regards to the 
assumption that dividend decision-making is 
primarily implemented by larger companies and 
those with a defi nite history, the basic group 
was further reduced to exclude companies with 
a yearly turn-over of under 30 million CZK and 
companies founded after 2008. The fi nal scope 
of the basic sample which fulfi lled the defi ned 
requirements was 159 joint-stock companies 
active in the investigated fi eld.
The survey took place from November 
2013 to January 2014. The questionnaires 
were distributed to the selected businesses via 
electronic mail and students from the University 
of Pardubice. The questionnaire was created for 
workers in fi nancial management – specifi cally, 
members of the executive board, who are 
assumed to have comprehensive knowledge and 
an overview of the company. In light of the number 
of contacted respondents, the authors attempted 
to ensure a suffi cient representative sample. It 
is possible to estimate the necessary minimal 
sample size using the following relationship:
 
(1)
where:
tα is the coeffi cient of reliability for the 
selected reliability α,
p is the estimate of the relative frequency of 
surveyed criteria in the basic sample,
d is the required permissible error,
If we require 90% reliability with 
a permissible error of 11%, then the minimum 
number of surveyed respondents is the 
following:
 
(2)
The minimum number of surveyed 
respondents for determining representation of 
selection should be 36.
From the perspective of probable statistics, 
the sample group was established by non-
random selection. With respect to the fact 
that the basic sample is not extensive, all 
159 companies were contacted using the 
questionnaire.
Of the total 159 companies contacted, 
44 questionnaires were returned. Two of the 
returned questionnaires were not entered into 
the statistical evaluation, because they were 
not completely fi lled out. The overall return rate 
was 26.42%. The representation of companies 
engaged in production and treatment of water 
was 45% of the sample and the rest, i.e., 55%, 
were producers and distributors of electricity, 
gas, steam and hot water. On the basis of the 
above information, we can consider the sample 
group to be representative.
3. Research Results
Table 1 provides the answers to the research 
question concerning which factors infl uence 
management when making decisions about 
dividend payout. The table illustrates the order 
of individual factors from most signifi cant 
to least signifi cant, including descriptive 
characteristics of the statistics (statistically 
signifi cant differences are in bold type).
From the data in the table, it is clear that 
management considers a wide range of factors 
when devising dividend policy. That indicates 
that dividend policy among the investigated 
companies differs, and there is no one factor 
. .
. .
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that is unimportant for management. From 
the perspective of statistical signifi cance, it is 
possible to divide the given factors in to three 
groups: i) important, statistically signifi cant 
factors, ii) average factors for which no statistical 
importance was demonstrated and iii) factors of 
below-average importance for which statistical 
signifi cance was demonstrated. 
From the total of 20 factors investigated, 
respondents specifi ed the following factors 
as most signifi cant: F5 – Existing shareholder 
requirements, F11 – Limiting liquidity, F1 – The 
amount of actual profi t and F7 – Maintaining 
the target state of debt. All these factors 
are statistically signifi cant at a rate of 0.05 
signifi cance.
The most signifi cant factor is F5 – Existing 
shareholder requirements, which 95.23% of 
managers put down as medium to high in 
importance among the given factors. The course 
of privatization in the Czech Republic led to the 
emergence of concentrated ownership, where 
shareholders more easily force management 
to act in the shareholder’s interests, including 
Factor
Level of Importance (%)
Average t-test None Low Medium High
0 1 2 3
F5 Existing shareholder requirements 4.76% 0.00% 35.71% 59.52% 2.5 8.75
F11 Limiting liquidity (access to funds) 9.52% 21.43% 45.24% 23.80% 1.95 2.97
F1 The amount of actual profi t 9.52% 21.43% 45.24% 23.81% 1.83 2.38
F7 Maintaining the target state of debt 0.00% 40.48% 47.62% 11.9% 1.71 2.38
F6 The stability of profi t 4.76% 35.71% 52.38% 7.14% 1.62 2.06
F14 The expected amount of future profi t 7.14% 42.86% 45.24% 4.76% 1.48 -0.22
F12 The actual infl uence of fi nancial leverage 9.52% 40.47% 50.00% 0.00% 1.4 -0.93
F8 The expected degree of the productivity of activities 7.14% 47.62% 45.24% 0.00% 1.38 -1.24
F13 Investment opportunities (access to profi table 
projects)
9.52% 52.38% 30.95% 7.14% 1.36 -1.22
F4 Costs for acquiring new sources of fi nancing 9.52% 54.76% 30.95% 4.76% 1.31 -1.73
F2 Access to alternative sources of capital 14.28% 45.24% 40.47% 0.00% 1.26 -2.2
F9 Infl uence fi rm value (shares) 9.52% 64.29% 26.19% 0.00% 1.17 -3.72
F19 Contractual limitations (e. g., from credit 
contracts)
40.48% 33.33% 14.28% 11.90% 0.98 -3.31
F3 The future state of the economy (macroeconomic 
indicators)
19.05% 16.67% 14.29% 0.00% 0.95 -6.09
F17 Maintain the payout ratio 23.81% 66.67% 9.52% 0.00% 0.86 -7.36
F16 Send out a positive signal to investors (creditors) 30.95% 54.76% 11.90% 2.38% 0.86 -5.8
F10 Legislative measures 28.57% 64.28% 7.14% 0.00% 0.78 -8.19
F18 Maintain the history of dividend payout 35.71% 57.14% 7.14% 0.00% 0.71 -8.54
F15 Dividend policy in accordance with the 
competition
45.24% 42.86% 11.9% 0.00% 0.67 -7.86
F20 Avoid a warning signal for investors in the form of 
lowering the dividend
47.62% 52.38% 0.00% 0.00% 0.52 -12.51
Source: own
Tab. 1:
The factors infl uencing management when making decisions about dividend 
payout
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dividend payout at a corresponding rate. 
F1 – The amount of actual profi t is another 
important factor. Profi t represents the criteria 
for management’s success at assessing 
entrusted economic sources, and profi t is the 
basic prerequisite for management’s decision 
concerning dividend payout. For this reason 
are important accounting records because the 
resulting fi nancial statements and reports help 
plan and make decisions [30]. According to the 
respondents, other signifi cant factors assessed 
that infl uence decision-making concerning 
dividends are F11 – Limiting liquidity (access to 
funds) and F7 – Maintaining the target state of 
debt. In accounting, profi t is reported using the 
accrual concept, which does not indicate the 
company’s ability to generate money with its 
activities. From the perspective of the corporate 
fi nancial balance sheet, funds are important, 
because then the enterprise is capable of 
fulfi lling their commitments, including the ability 
to pay dividends. The state of debt indicates the 
reality that a business uses external sources 
for fi nancing its activities, i. e., debt. The basic 
problem of a company’s fi nancial management 
is the choice of the correct sources for fi nancing 
their activities – fi nding the optimal relationship 
between owned capital and borrowed capital.
The next group of factors listed by the 
respondents are those of average importance, 
but statistically insignifi cant. The most 
signifi cant factors in this group are F6 The 
stability of profi t and F14 The expected amount 
of future profi t. This is possible to interpret to 
mean that managers do not consider dividend 
decision-making to be a behavioral question 
in the style of Lintner’s model, but make 
decisions operationally according to the actual 
situation and primarily according to shareholder 
requirements. This is confi rmed by factors F18 
Maintain the history of dividend payout and 
F17 Maintain payout rate, which are, from the 
perspective of importance, below-average and 
statistically signifi cant.
Other factors of average importance but 
statistically insignifi cant are F12 The actual 
infl uence of fi nancial leverage, F8 The expected 
degree of the productivity of activities, F13 
Investment opportunities (access to profi table 
projects) and F14 Costs for acquiring new 
sources of fi nancing. It is possible to include 
these factors under fi nancial decision-making 
concerning investments, when the optimal 
chosen combination of factors is able to 
raise company profi t, which is able to be 
subsequently distributed to shareholders in the 
form of dividends.
The remaining ten factors are of below-
average importance and statistically 
signifi cant. This group includes the factor F2 
Access to alternative sources of capital. Its low 
level of importance indicates that obtaining 
sources for fi nancing is clearly not diffi cult for 
managers. Low debt and company profi tability 
provide potential creditors with a suitable, 
low risk investment opportunity. Factor F19 
Contractual limitations is given a below-
average rating, but the importance of this factor 
within the conditions of the investigated fi eld 
was confi rmed as a part of the survey. Two 
respondents stated that their current credit 
contracts contain clauses forbidding dividend 
payout.
Tables 2–6 below verify the validity of 
hypothesis H1. Five sub-hypothesis were defi ned 
for its verifi cation. The fi rst sub-hypothesis 
determined whether dividend policy infl uences 
fi rm value. The question of whether or how 
dividend policy infl uences fi rm value has been 
following academic workers and managers for 
decades. The authors of [27] proved that, under 
a perfect market, fi rm value does not depend 
on dividend policy. The wording of the questions 
and relative frequency of answers expressing 
the position of respondents on dividend policy 
and fi rm value are listed in Table 2 below.
The most explicit agreement was given by 
the respondents to the statement that dividend 
policy should attempt to maximize fi rm value for 
shareholders and dividend policy is the main 
factor that infl uences a fi rm’s market value with 
83.3% and 66.67% of respondents respectively 
expressing slight or strong agreement. Only 
54.76% of respondents agreed somewhat or 
strongly with the statement that a change in 
the dividend infl uences fi rm value. All of the 
statements are statistically signifi cant. 
A summary overview of the number of 
answers for the three statements concerning 
dividend policy and fi rm value provides support 
for sub-hypothesis H1a – that dividend policy 
does infl uence fi rm value. This conclusion is 
therefore in confl ict with the theory of dividend 
neutrality from source [27].
The second sub-hypothesis, H1b, 
investigated the signifi cance of dividend policy 
on investment and fi nancial decision-making. 
The wording of the questions and the relative 
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1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Statement from the questionnaire 
to which the respondents reacted
Relative frequency 
of answers supporting 
the statement (%)
Relative frequency 
of answers, „I don‘t 
know“ (%) 
Relative frequency of 
answers in confl ict with 
the statement (%)
Median
H1 Dividend policy should attempt to 
maximize fi rm value for shareholders
I strongly agree 47.62
16.67
I strongly disagree 0.00
4I somewhat agree 35.71 I somewhat disagree 0.00
agreement 83.33 disagreement 0.00
H2 Dividend policy is the main factor 
which infl uences a fi rm‘s market value
I strongly agree 19.05
28.57
I strongly disagree 0.0
4I somewhat agree 47.62 I somewhat disagree 4.76
agreement 66.67 disagreement 4.76
H3 A change in the dividend 
infl uences fi rm value
I strongly agree 11.90
28.57
I strongly disagree 0.0
4I somewhat agree 42.86 I somewhat disagree 16.67
agreement 54.76 disagreement 16.67
Source: own
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Statement from the questionnaire 
to which the respondents reacted
Relative frequency of 
answers supporting the 
statement (%)
Relative frequency 
of answers, „I don‘t 
know“ (%) 
Relative frequency of 
answers in confl ict with 
the statement (%)
Median
F1 Dividends are paid after using all 
other investment alternatives
I strongly agree 19.05
30.95
I strongly disagree 0.00
4I somewhat agree 50.00 I somewhat disagree 0.00
agreement 69.05 disagreement 0.00
F2 Investment, fi nancial, and 
dividend decisions are interrelated
I strongly agree 47.62
19.05
I strongly disagree 0.00
4I somewhat agree 33.33 I somewhat disagree 0.00
agreement 80.95 disagreement 0.00
F3 Financing investments with 
undivided profi ts is cheaper than 
external fi nancing
I strongly agree 33.33
19.05
I strongly disagree 0.00
4I somewhat agree 47.61 I somewhat disagree 0.00
agreement 80.94 disagreement 0.00
F4 Dividends represent a fl exible tool 
for optimizing capital structure
I strongly agree 23.81
47.62
I strongly disagree 0.0
3I somewhat agree 19.05 I somewhat disagree 9.52
agreement 42.85 disagreement 9.52
F5 Financing with the help of 
retained earnings rather than 
externally is subject to less control by 
external creditors
I strongly agree 28.57
47.61
I strongly disagree 0.00
3I somewhat agree 4.76 I somewhat disagree 19.05
agreement 33.32 disagreement 19.05
F6 Dividend policy infl uences capital 
costs
I strongly agree 14.28
47.62
I strongly disagree 0.00
3.5I somewhat agree 38.09 I somewhat disagree 0.00
agreement 52.37 disagreement 0.00
Source: own
Tab. 2: The relative frequency of answers to the question testing hypothesis H1a
Tab. 3: The relative frequency of answers to the questions testing hypothesis H1b
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frequency of answers expressing the position 
of respondents to investment and fi nancial 
decision-making are shown in Table 3.
Appropriately established corporate 
investment and fi nancial strategy can increase 
fi rm value. Within investment decision-making, 
this means the choice of effective investment 
alternatives; from the perspective of fi nancial 
decision-making, this means optimizing the 
company’s capital structure. The benefi t of this 
strategy lies in raising company profi t, which 
can be subsequently distributed to shareholders 
in the form of dividends. This set dividend 
policy is the result of investment and fi nancial 
decisions. Of the respondents, 80.95% agreed 
with the statement that investment, fi nancial 
and dividend decisions are interrelated; this 
statement is statistically signifi cant.
On the other hand, the relationship between 
dividend policy, investments and capital structure 
can be the reverse. This situation arises in the 
case of residual dividend policy, where dividends 
are paid only when all investments have been 
carried out and the company still has residual 
funds available. The statement that dividends 
are paid after implementing all other investments 
had a strong or slight agreement rate of 69.05% 
among managers and is statistically signifi cant.
In relation to investment decision-making, 
there is residual policy, which renders “more 
fl exible” dividends more attractive. According 
to the pecking order theory, this is because 
management prioritized undivided profi t over 
issuing shares or bonds during fi nancing 
because of high fl otation costs. Undivided 
profi t can be the only source of fi nancing in the 
case of restriction of access to sources on the 
fi nancial market. The statement that fi nancing 
investments with undivided profi t is cheaper 
than external fi nancing is statistically signifi cant 
and gained a strong or slight agreement rate of 
80.9% from respondents.
Moreover, management yields greater 
control to the side of investors when using 
external fi nancing. The statement that fi nancing 
with the help of retained earnings rather than 
externally is subject to less control by external 
creditors had a strong or slight agreement rate 
of 33.3% of respondents. This conclusion can 
relate to the fact that, in the case of a dominant 
shareholder, this shareholder watches over 
the management to make sure there will be 
no ineffective spending of fi nancial resources. 
It is necessary to add that, for this statement, 
a large amount of respondents did not have an 
opinion, which is statistically signifi cant.
Dividend payout means a change in the 
structure of fi nancial sources. Unpaid dividends 
strengthen owned capital at the expense of 
borrowed capital and the reverse. With the correct 
choice of composition of owned and borrowed 
capital, management sets the balance between 
risk and yield with the goal of maximizing the 
enterprise’s value. The statement that dividends 
represent a fl exible tool for optimizing capital 
structure had a rate of 42.85% of respondents 
having slight or strong agreement.
Raising the rate of external sources in 
relation to internal sources raises the fi rm’s risk 
level from the creditors’ perspective; thereby, the 
willingness of creditors to lend to the company 
will decrease and borrowing costs will be higher. 
On the other hand, not paying dividends and 
thereby strengthening owned capital creates 
better conditions for capital acquisition costs. 
The statement that dividend policy infl uences 
capital costs had strong or slight agreement 
from 52.37% of respondents. On the basis of 
the number of answers supporting the individual 
statement, it is possible to confi rm the given 
hypothesis H1b.
The third sub-hypothesis, H1c, concerns 
the theory of signaling. According to this theory, 
dividends are a signaling mechanism by which 
companies can lower information asymmetry 
between management and shareholders. By 
means of changes in dividend policy, investors 
can deduce information about future company 
performance. The respondents’ opinions on 
the signifi cance of dividends as a means of 
information transfer between managers and 
shareholders is shown in Table 4 below.
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From the data in the table, it can be said 
that of the statements expressing support for 
the dividend mechanism’s importance, the most 
supported statements were that the dividend 
represents one of the main tools investors use 
to evaluate corporate performance, which gained 
64.28% agreement, and the statement that 
the company should communicate reasons for 
changes in dividend amount with investors, which 
was supported by 64.28% of respondents. The 
importance of dividends is also supported by the 
statement that if there are other tools for imparting 
market information, then the dividend does not 
represent an important signal, which was not 
endorsed by only 7.14% of the respondents.
The thesis that dividend change indicates 
a change in future profi ts was not proved 
for the companies studied. The statement 
that a decrease (increase) in the dividend 
signals deterioration (improvement) of future 
profi ts showed agreement of 28.57% and no 
opinion on the given problematic for 45.23% of 
respondents; this statement is without statistical 
repercussions. This conclusion corresponds 
to the support for statement S5 that when 
reasons for dividend change are shared, then 
the dividend need not indicate change in 
company performance. Managers can react to 
an investment opportunity by lowering or not 
paying the dividend and the reverse. Related to 
this is the statement that dividends represent 
unused fi nancial resources for profi table 
projects, which gained a mere 38.19% of 
agreement from the respondents and is without 
statistical repercussion.
The statement that when determining 
corporate strategy, other fi rms’ dividend 
policy trends are taken into consideration has 
a disagreement rate of 21.44% of respondents; 
this disagreement is statistically signifi cant. 
This viewpoint also corresponds with factor 
F15 Dividend policy in accordance with the 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Statement from the questionnaire 
to which the respondents reacted
Relative frequency of 
answers supporting the 
statement (%)
Relative frequency 
of answers, „I don‘t 
know“ (%) 
Relative frequency of 
answers in confl ict with 
the statement (%)
Median
S1 The dividend represents one 
of the main tools investors use to 
evaluate corporate performance
I strongly agree 23.80
26.19
I strongly disagree 0.00
4I somewhat agree 40.48 I somewhat disagree 9.52
agreement 64.28 disagreement 9.52
S2 Dividends represent unused 
fi nancial resources for profi table 
projects
I strongly agree 16.67
30.95
I strongly disagree 19.04
3I somewhat agree 21.52 I somewhat disagree 11.90
agreement 38.19 disagreement 30.94
S3 A decrease (increase) in the 
dividend signals deterioration 
(improvement) of future profi ts
I strongly agree 0.00
45.23
I strongly disagree 0.00
3I somewhat agree 28.57 I somewhat disagree 26.21
agreement 28.57 disagreement 26.21
S4 The company should 
communicate reasons for changes in 
dividend amount with investors
I strongly agree 35.71
21.43
I strongly disagree 0.00
4I somewhat agree 28.57 I somewhat disagree 14.29
agreement 64.28 disagreement 14.29
S5 If there are other tools for 
imparting market information, then 
the dividend does not represent an 
important signal
I strongly agree 0.00
52.38
I strongly disagree 0.00
3I somewhat agree 40.48 I somewhat disagree 7.14
agreement 40.48 disagreement 7.14
S6 When determining corporate 
strategy, other fi rms‘ dividend policy 
trends are taken into consideration 
I strongly agree 0.00
69.04
I strongly disagree 4.77
3I somewhat agree 9.52 I somewhat disagree 16.67
agreement 9.52 disagreement 21.44
Source: own
Tab. 4: The relative frequency of answers to the questions testing hypothesis H1c
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competition listed in question four – respondents 
consider this of low importance when deciding 
dividend payout.
On the basis of the number of answers 
expressing the respondents’ position on 
individual questions, it is not possible to confi rm 
the given hypothesis H1c.
The fourth sub-hypothesis, H1d, 
investigated the respondents’ opinions as 
to whether dividends can serve as a tool for 
limiting agency problems between shareholders 
(investors) and managers. The problem occurs 
when managers act in their own interests and 
do not take the shareholders’ interests into 
suffi cient consideration. The wording of the 
questions and relative frequency of answers 
expressing the respondents’ positions on the 
importance of dividends as a tool for reducing 
the agency problem between shareholders and 
management are listed in Table 5 below.
The predominantly high level of 
disagreement with individual statements 
does not support the importance of dividends 
for resolving agency problems between 
shareholders and management. Respondents 
registered the most explicit disagreement to the 
statement that raising the dividend lowers the 
shareholders’ need to supervise management; 
64.29% of respondents disagreed with this 
to a greater or lesser degree. The statement 
that the dividend forces businesses to look for 
external sources of fi nancing, which raises the 
level of control shareholders and creditors have 
over management showed disagreement of 38% 
of respondents and is statistically signifi cant. 
The respondents listed only agreement 
with the fi rst statement that the dividend 
serves as a tool to make managers act in the 
shareholders’ interest. This agreement could be 
caused by a combination of misunderstanding 
the questions and the fact that respondents 
consider F5 Existing shareholder requirements 
to be the most important factor in dividend 
policy. In addition to the higher level of 
disagreement, respondents often responded to 
individual statements with “I don’t know, without 
opinion.” These respondents’ positions indicate 
either unfamiliarity with the given problem or 
that other tools are used in resolving confl ict 
between management and shareholders.
On the basis of the number of answers 
expressing respondents’ positions on individual 
questions, it is not possible to confi rm the given 
hypothesis, H1d.
The fi fth sub-hypothesis, H1e, investigated 
the respondents’ opinions on how ownership 
structure can infl uence corporate dividend 
policy and thereby indirectly infl uence fi rm 
value as well. In the case that ownership is in 
the hands of one individual, such individuals 
usually manage the fi rm by themselves or 
select and supervise management and provide 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Statement from the questionnaire 
to which the respondents reacted
Relative frequency of 
answers supporting the 
statement (%)
Relative frequency 
of answers, „I don‘t 
know“ (%) 
Relative frequency of 
answers in confl ict with 
the statement (%)
Median
N1 The dividend serves as a tool 
to make managers act in the 
shareholders‘ interest
I strongly agree 2.38
45.24
I strongly disagree 2.38
3I somewhat agree 40.24 I somewhat disagree 9.52
agreement 42.62 disagreement 11.9
N2 Raising the dividend lowers the 
shareholders‘ need to supervise 
management
I strongly agree 0.00
21.43
I strongly disagree 19.05
2I somewhat agree 14.28 I somewhat disagree 45.24
agreement 14.28 disagreement 64.29
N3 The dividend forces businesses 
to look for external sources of 
fi nancing, which raises the level of 
control shareholders and creditors 
have over management
I strongly agree 0.00
54.76
I strongly disagree 7.14
3I somewhat agree 7.14 I somewhat disagree 30.95
agreement 7.14 disagreement 38.09
Source: own
Tab. 5: The relative frequency of answers to the questions testing hypothesis H1d
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individual decisions autonomously with the 
goal of maximizing their own wealth. However, 
companies are characterized by various forms 
of part-ownership, in which there are multiple 
owners. Individual shareholders can have 
various reasons for distributing dividends 
or a goal concerning dividend amount or 
retaining profi t for reinvestment. The wording 
of the questions and the relative frequency of 
answers expressing the respondents’ positions 
on shareholder importance in dividend policy 
are listed in Table 6 below.
Respondents gave the most explicit 
agreement to the statements that shareholder 
requirements are an important factor in decision-
making concerning dividend policy and the 
company creates dividend policy on the basis 
of the main shareholders’ requirements; 95% 
of respondents agreed with these statements, 
which is statistically signifi cant. These overall 
positions of agreement are consistent with 
the conclusions of the research question in 
which respondents listed the most important 
factor when making decisions as F5 Existing 
shareholder requirements.
In the Czech Republic, the system of taxing 
dividends is founded on the classic system, 
which consists of the separation of taxed 
1. 2. 3. 4. 5.
Statement from the questionnaire 
to which the respondents reacted
Relative frequency of 
answers supporting the 
statement (%)
Relative 
frequency 
of answers, 
„I don‘t know“ 
(%) 
Relative frequency of 
answers in confl ict with 
the statement (%)
Median
A1 Shareholder requirements are an 
important factor in decision-making 
concerning dividend policy
I strongly agree 66.67
4.76
I strongly disagree 0.00
5I somewhat agree 28.57 I somewhat disagree 0.00
agreement 95.24 disagreement 0.00
A2 Shareholders prefer a cash 
dividend rather than a higher, 
unpredictable capital profi t
I strongly agree 38.07
28.57
I strongly disagree 0.00
4I somewhat agree 21.43 I somewhat disagree 11.91
agreement 59.52 disagreement 11.91
A3 The company creates dividend 
policy on the basis of the main 
shareholders‘ requirements
I strongly agree 85.71
4.76
I strongly disagree 0.00
5I somewhat agree 9.52 I somewhat disagree 0.00
agreement 95.23 disagreement 0.00
A4 Shareholders prefer stable 
dividends
I strongly agree 21.43
19.04
I strongly disagree 7.14
4I somewhat agree 30.95 I somewhat disagree 21.43
agreement 52.38 disagreement 28.57
A5 Tax incidence for shareholders is 
an important factor when decision-
making concerning dividend policy
I strongly agree 19.05
16.67
I strongly disagree 0.00
4I somewhat agree 52.38 I somewhat disagree 11.90
agreement 71.43 disagreement 11.90
A6 Majority and minority 
shareholders have differing dividend 
preferences
I strongly agree 30.95
35.71
I strongly disagree 7.14
3I somewhat agree 14.29 I somewhat disagree 11.90
agreement 45.24 disagreement 19.04
A7 Internal and external 
shareholders have differing dividend 
preferences
I strongly agree 11.90
40.47
I strongly disagree 7.14
3I somewhat agree 23.81 I somewhat disagree 16.67
agreement 35.71 disagreement 23.81
Source: own
Tab. 6: The relative frequency of answers to the questions testing hypothesis H1e
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profi ts and dividends – without their being 
mutually interrelated in any way. Dividend 
taxation is performed by withholding tax at 
a rate of 15%. The statement that tax incidence 
for shareholders is an important factor when 
decision-making concerning dividend policy 
indicated agreement by 71.4% of respondents 
and is statistically signifi cant. In relation to the 
affi rmative statement A2 and low state of debt 
of the observed businesses, freeing dividends 
from tax could result in raising the number of 
companies with dividend payout.
The statement that shareholders prefer 
a cash dividend rather than a higher, 
unpredictable capital profi t received agreement 
from 59.5% of respondents. A similarly 
signifi cant level of agreement was shown by 
the statement that shareholders prefer stable 
dividends. It is possible to interpret this position 
as the fact that shareholders do not trust 
managers to invest undivided profi t reasonably 
or that they have doubts about management 
abusing fi nancial resources.
The statements A6 and A7 commented on 
the differences in dividend preferences between 
majority and minority shareholders and 
between internal and external shareholders. 
In both cases, the affi rmative position was 
predominant among respondents, but, in 
the case of the statement that internal and 
external shareholders have differing dividend 
preferences, this agreement was statistically 
insignifi cant.
From the number of answers supporting the 
statements, it is possible to confi rm hypothesis 
H1e. This is in accordance with the conclusions 
of the research question concerning which 
factors infl uence management when making 
decisions about dividend payout, for which the 
most important factor was listed as F5 Existing 
shareholder requirements.
Conclusion
One of the key areas of corporate fi nancial 
management is decision-making concerning 
the distribution of economic results. The 
dividend can be considered to be one option for 
distributing economic results while fulfi lling legal 
conditions. For many shareholders, dividend 
payout is an important part of their decision-
making concerning investments.
The goal of this article was to identify factors 
that infl uence management in the investigated 
sector when making decisions about dividend 
payout. The respondents had twenty factors 
to choose from. The survey made it clear that 
the most important factors for management are 
the following: (1) the requirements of existing 
shareholders, (2) access to funds, (3) the actual 
amount of profi t and (4) maintaining the target 
state of debt. All these factors were of above-
average importance and statistically signifi cant 
on the basis of the t-test. There were another six 
indicators with average importance, however, 
none of them showed statistical signifi cance at 
a signifi cance of α = 0.05. Managers considered 
the remaining factors to be of below-average 
importance.
Especially in academic circles, the most 
commonly accepted theory is the theory 
of dividend neutrality, which says that fi rm 
value is entirely independent of its dividend 
policy. According to critics of this theory, the 
prerequisites considered are too abstract and 
unusable in the real fi nancial world. Therefore, 
another goal of this article was to determine 
the respondents’ position on whether and how 
dividend policy infl uences fi rm value. With this 
in mind, the hypothesis that dividend payout 
infl uences market imperfections, which result 
in infl uencing fi rm value was formulated. The 
answer to this hypothesis was achieved by 
formulating fi ve sub-hypotheses.
Research results supported the validity of 
the base hypothesis. However, hypotheses H1c 
and H1d do not provide support for dividends 
in favor of lowering information asymmetry 
and agency costs between management and 
shareholders. This conclusion can be caused 
by the respondents’ insuffi cient theoretical 
knowledge of the given problematic. Another 
cause can be ownership structure, when 
the fi rms investigated are characterized by 
high ownership concentration, i.e., when 
the companies are governed by one or 
two signifi cant shareholders. An important 
shareholder is able to protect other 
shareholders from management implementing 
their own interests. In these cases, it is possible 
to expect that there will be no information 
asymmetry between the shareholders and the 
management, resulting in no agency confl ict or 
its consequent costs. Knowledge of the most 
important factors for dividend payout enables 
existing shareholders and potential investors to 
make decisions more objectively. Businessmen 
with stocks and fi nancial advisers can also use 
the research results practically for appropriately 
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timing clients’ investments to receive dividend 
yields.
From the research conducted, it is clear that 
shareholder requirements are the most important 
factor when shaping dividend policy for the 
investigated companies. To this end, this primary 
research was expanded into secondary research. 
Seven regressive models were composed to 
identify and defi ne the strength of individual 
factors for dividend payout among individual 
types of shareholders. Likewise, the results of this 
research will be published subsequently.
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Abstract
THE POSITION OF MANAGEMENT OF CZECH JOINT-STOCK COMPANIES 
ON DIVIDEND POLICY
František Sejkora, Pavel Duspiva
The concept of distributing economic results belongs unequivocally among management’s basic 
fi nancial decisions. Dividend payout to shareholders can be considered to be the distribution of 
economic results while fulfi lling legal conditions. The goal of this article is to identify factors that 
have a fundamental infl uence on dividend payout and to further determine and evaluate the position 
of management on dividend theories. This problematic is current for the conditions of Czech 
joint-stock companies, because deeper studies in this area are not available for recent years. 
Nevertheless, currently, the greater majority of joint-stock companies now regularly pay dividends, 
and dividend policy has become a part of their fi nancial policy that is impossible to overlook. With 
regards to the fact that profi t is the necessary condition for dividend payout, research was aimed 
at the sector, “Production and Distribution of Electricity, Gas and Water,” which is most interesting 
among Czech joint-stock companies from the perspective of profi tability and frequency of dividend 
payout. For the reasons of quantitative research, a two-part questionnaire was created for workers 
in fi nancial management – specifi cally, members of the executive board, who are assumed to 
have comprehensive knowledge and an overview of the company. The survey showed that the 
most important factors for management when making decisions concerning dividend payout are 
the following: the requirements of existing shareholders, access to funds, the actual amount of 
profi t and maintaining the target state of debt. Further results confi rmed that dividend policy does 
infl uence fi rm value. However, dividends are not supported as a tool for lowering information 
asymmetry and agency costs between management and shareholders. This conclusion can be 
caused by ownership structure when the fi rms investigated are characterized by high concentration 
of ownership; then, one shareholder is able to better protect the other shareholders against the 
implementation of management’s interests. 
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